Limitations in History. Part II.
Theory and Eastern Cape Historical Research

C. Engelbrecht

(Revised: July 2019)

Abstract

Theories are in themselves not constant but important in the formation of scientific knowledge. Its distinction from practice is not merely of academic importance and does reveal an intuitive characteristic. Its value in classification is of theoretical and practical intent. The demarcation between theory and practice remains arbitrary though Van Dyke's classification of theory is useful. The relevance of theory is determined by the prevailing conditions although relative.

1. Introduction

Historians often draw criticism that they seldom engage in the philosophical foundations of their subject, that they view facts as relatively unproblematic and that they are content with collecting information in order to simply interpret and explain their subject matter (Engelbrecht 2019a: 1–20, Engelbrecht 2019b: 1–25). The question then arises: if historical writing includes interpretation and explanation, to what extent should historical writing form part of reconstructive societal theory? In other words: do (or should) historians write history with a practical intent?

This paper investigates the nature of the concept 'theory' and makes cryptic references to examples of its application to Eastern Cape historiography. First, a few comments between theory and practice in ancient times will suffice, followed by a distinction between theory and practice in everyday language. Thirdly, we deal with the relationship between theories and (in) social sciences. The structure of theory in section five forms the main part of this paper in which general observations, approaches to defining theory, and the characteristics of theory,

are covered. In concluding, the importance of theory in (and for) historical research closes the loop regarding criticisms levelled at historians.

2. Ancient distinction between theory and practice

Classical distinctions between theory and practice, date back to Aristotle's (1991) *Metaphysics.* *Theoria* is to 'know' and 'understand' for the sake of knowledge in itself, whilst *praxis* (or practical knowledge) is instrumental for the 'good life'. This early distinction between *epistémé* (or pure theory) and *techné* (as practice), is generally no longer practised today, but in Aristotelian times, they were regarded as two different approaches in dealing with the same abstract 'thing' – *viz.* knowledge.

This paper is concerned with the first concept, namely *epistémé.* From *epistémé* developed another concept, *theórétike dianoia* that is knowledge, which later became *scientific* knowledge (Parry 2007: 1). There appears to be two general uses of the word *theory:* one in empirical sciences, and the second in philosophy, logic, mathematics and humanities. The word theory is derived from the Greek word *theoria* (or contemplation) – meaning universal knowledge. *Theoria* is an *energía* – a kind of activity engaged in the investigation of explanations. Contemplation, however, was considered the most advanced human activity.

The second concept, *techné,* on the other hand, is *poiésis,* or the production of something (Hanley n.d). In Aristotle's philosophy, this would become science: *practical* science (e.g. ethics, politics), *poetical* science (e.g. poetry and fine arts) and *theoretical* philosophy (e.g. physics, mathematics and metaphysics). Still, the study of *Logic* preceded philosophy.

3. Theory and practice in everyday language

In ordinary language conversations, we often hear that 'in theory that's true, but in practice it does not work' or, 'I am a practical person'. In so saying, the impression is then created that theory is contrasted to practice. Theory is regarded as abstract (of the mind), whilst practice, is considered as action-orientated (concrete or practical) by nature. Such everyday distinctions between *theory* and (its antecedent) *practice,* is useful because it will assist in future philosophical dealings with the concept *praxis.* In addition, this distinction between theory and practice influences the theory and methodology of historical writing and therefore practical research outcomes.

Theory and practice are two sides of the same coin. We talk of the practice of e.g. conservation theory when environments are rehabilitated to their original or pristine conditions. Regardless of the perceived differences between theory and practice in everyday common language, the conclusion remains that they are two different modes – certainly dialectical in

nature. The reality is that the *theoretician*, when theorizing, is practical in his/her endeavours. The *practical* person on the other hand, when acting, has guiding theoretical underpinning/s for his/her everyday behaviour. In both instances, a certain act took place because action is the result of human wills, but theory and practice remain, distinctly different from each other. Regardless, theory, practice and action, remain inextricably linked despite their distinctiveness.

4. Theory and social sciences

Although controversial, definitions remain useful in (and for) research. The word *theory* (as used in the English language from the 16th century), is (provisionally) described as *a set of ideas formulated by rational reasoning from known facts that explain the study object.* Theory does not exclude opinions (or suppositions) and is treated as a statement of the principles on which knowledge and understanding of a subject are based. Consider for instance, the various theories developed over many years regarding the Kowie River mouth at Port Alfred and how best to manage it.

Since humans have a propensity to classify things, the importance of theory for researchers is to place their research in a predetermined structure (or intellectual framework) for ease of understanding of research objectives. For instance, Marx and Engels classified society into *oppressors* (e.g. freeman, patrican, lord, guild master) and *oppressed* (e.g. slave, plebeian, serf and journeyman). Secondly, for centuries the South African society was interpreted, classified and governed along *race* considerations. Thirdly (and relevant to Eastern Cape history) is Hopkins's classification of globalization into periods of archaic, proto-, modern and post-colonial globalization (Hopkins 2002: 3). Accordingly, the arrival of the 1820 Settlers in the Albany District can be interpreted in terms of *modern* globalization theory, because the scheme fits the fundamentals of Scheuerman's concept of the modern globalization period (Scheuerman 2006: 1–13). Lastly, the most elementary form of classification that pertains to 1820 Settler history, is their categorization into places of origin, and/or location/s, where they finally settled (Jones 1969: 5–6, 75).

Historians need to deal with contemporary social facts from new perspectives in a structured format and in a critical manner. The most obvious reason is the escalating globalization of knowledge in general, but specifically, such that refers to legitimate moral concerns about the natural environment that is in crisis. Concerns about global or Eastern Cape environmental degradation no longer remain theoretical. Present-day worldwide environmental practices need reconsideration on a global scale. The growth of environmental history supports this view. This argument also applies to other areas of research.

A recent Eastern Cape case study emphasises this point. A scientific report regarding the environmental health of the East Kleinemonde estuary (Van Niekerk, Bate and Whitfield 2008)

outlined three strategic scenario recommendations in accordance with an Estuarine Health Index together with Ecological Reserve Categories for reconsidering current and future use practices of this unique estuary.

It is fair to state that social sciences tend to re-examine their philosophical foundations during periods of crises because they cannot justify the faith originally placed in them. Their proponents have lost confidence in the significance of previous research findings as well as their daily practices. Thus, they face an 'authority' crisis. Consequently, re-decisions and new methodological debates within their social sciences cannot be understood beyond social and historical contexts that underlie initial theoretical claims. Historical sciences are not exempted from this and therefore alternatives are required.

New considerations need to be founded on rational terms. Social scientists cannot separate logical and methodological foundations form those employed in natural sciences because in reality, all scientists need each other. Collectively, sciences have to treat empirical/normative-distinction of societal issues in more collaborative and practical terms. Fortunately, arguments in favour of interdisciplinary approaches are nothing new. For instance, in the 1920s, the Frankfurt School advocated interdisciplinary research under the directorship of Max Horkheimer (Held 1980: 175) and shortly after WW II, Bertrand Russell worked tirelessly to stage an international conference to promote joint scientific co-operation regardless of competing ideologies. The result was the Einstein-Russell manifesto that endeavoured to 'combine pure theory with a practical philosophy' (Russell 1971: 222) across geo-political and trans-ideological differences.

The question is: where does Eastern Cape historiography stand in relation to the above?

5. The structure of theory

5.1 General observations

Life is full of different theories regarding just about anything around us. South African historiography presents relevant examples for this analysis. For instance, Liberal historians interpreted intercultural relations as *race* relations, but from the late 1960s, Revisionist historians interpreted relations as *class* based. Martin Legassick for instance, interpreted South African frontier contact between different cultures on the basis of AG Frank's theory of unequal development of exchange (Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 245). Merle Lipton (1986: 4) also used Frank's dependency theory to explain how the capitalist metropole developed under-development in its periphery.

Applied to the greater Port Alfred area, the historically underdeveloped black township, Ndlambe, supplies cheap exploited labour to the capitalist developed Port Alfred's metropole.

With regards to other instances in the history of the Lower Albany, two further examples come to mind: one refers to various theories that pertain to the causes of the Blaauwkrantz Bridge railway disaster of 1911 (Bezuidenhout n.d.: 49ff), and the other to numerous theories involved in the construction of the Kowie harbour (Turpin 1964).

To complicate matters, the word theory has always been ambiguous – specifically because often sub-theories were developed within larger theories (e.g. Marx's theory of surplus value). In this regard, Popper dealt extensively with problems of demarcation in, and between theories, in order to outline the 'beginning' and 'end' of concepts. Here, they are reduced to a distinction between refutability and falsifiability of a theoretical system as criteria for demarcation. Realistically, the demarcation between theories cannot be absolutely resolved and at best, we differentiate between *well*-testable theories, *hardly* testable theories and *non*-testable theories. Consequently, different approaches to theory are normal. One approach proposes the development of theory of knowledge (abstract); theory of experience (practical), and intellectualist theory of knowledge (Popper 2002: xi, 12, 341ff). *Critical theory*, however, distinguishes between 'traditional' and 'critical' theory. This distinction is according to a 'specific practical purpose'. A theory is regarded critical 'to the extent that it seeks human emancipation' through critiquing and changing society as a whole. Critical theorists place history central in their approach to philosophy and society because they are concerned with both interpretation and transformation of that society. *Traditional theory*, on the other hand, does not seek human emancipation, but rather empirical scientific results. Therefore, the dialectical relationship between different approaches to theory and different theories that underlie various approaches, remain present in both critical and traditional theory.

As a general principle, scientific theory is an explanation or model based on observation, experimentation and rational reasoning that assist to explain and predict phenomena in the natural world. Once developed, it needs to be tested and confirmed. Because theory is based on facts, a clear distinction is necessary between facts ('things' which can be observed and/or measured) and theories (explanations which correlates to and interpret, these facts). The result is that theories may be good, bad or indifferent and when they are not supported by, or based on facts, they then lack credibility.

Furthermore, investigation into the concept theory is clouded by the relationship between theory and other closely associated concepts – hence the above demarcation dilemma. Facts are statements about 'something' and do not exist without the other. One close relation to theory is the word 'law'. Laws can be formulated from statements, and from laws, theories are constructed. For example, in everyday language, the words 'hypothesis' and 'theory' are frequently used synonymously. Realistically, they are not the same. A hypothesis postulates a proposed explanation for an observable phenomenon, whilst theories are based on them until

replaced by others. Similarly, it would help if scientists indicate their different approaches in defining theory.

5.2 Approaches to defining theory

The importance of theory in developed science is often taken for granted because we forget that theory ultimately underscores science. The casual use of the word theory describes general statements or empirical generalizations that are based on fact/s. Theories assist researchers to systemize knowledge that allows continual innovation and self-sustaining growth of knowledge. They characterize the 'structure' of scientific explanation and are important in history because historians draw conclusions from relevant theories of past and present historical thinking in their attempts to arrive at new insights. In econometrics for instance, theories are applied to produce statistical extrapolations. For example, ornithological studies that have to contend with limited data pertaining to the behavioural practices of the African Black Oystercatcher between Port Alfred and the Fish River mouth, would apply such methodology.

Van Dyke (1978: 89–91) for example, presented five approaches to define theory. The first approach defines theory in terms of thoughts, conjectures or ideas. In the case of thoughts, he included 'pure' theory of the following kind: if p then q. In applied theory: since p therefore q. In the case of conjectures, he listed causal relationships between cause and effect, whilst definitions in terms of ideas, display normative and descriptive potentialities: e.g. 'philosophising about government'. A second approach is to view a theory as a hypothesis. Once the hypothesis has been confirmed, it may be considered a law. Thirdly, a theory can be defined within a science, e.g. a 'political theory' as a subdivision of political science. Since all sciences employ theory, it can also be defined as a conceptual scheme, i.e. a set of intellectual concepts. Theory can be seen as an interpretation, or someone's point of view, i.e. a working hypothesis. Lastly, Van Dyke defined theory as an explanation. In this instance, theory includes statements that describe the connections and interrelationships among phenomena. The aim is not only to tell *what* happened, but also to present the *how* and *why?* In order to do so, we need to consider the characteristics of theory.

5.3 The inside of theory: some characteristics

The lack of consensus about approaches to defining scientific theory in the literature makes it almost futile to seek such. However, different approaches to defining theory, share at least principles of truth, belief and justification. This means that we can characterize scientific theories, as well as point to their relevance for historical research.

Theories do not simply fall from the sky. Everyday observations of our natural world, or our impressions from it, precede theory in the sense that outside impressions impinge on the mind of the observer during the normal cognitive process. Therefore, all knowledge begins with sense-experience. Because theory can be regarded as a 'kind' of thinking, it is often quite natural to think 'outside' a prevailing theory. Sometimes we are encouraged to 'think out of the box' – meaning to think beyond the norm or mainstream, of conventional beliefs. This is why the observation is often made that all history is the history of thought.

The origin of theory stems from the imagination of the theorist as an idea in the mind of someone. This makes the abstract nature of theory the second characteristic. This imagination or idea, in turn, originates from cognitive realities around us. Since scientific theory originates from abstract hypothetical creative human thinking, it is in the formative stages highly speculative in nature and therefore pre-supposes a proposition that often changes a few times before it is finally formulated. At this stage, propositions constitute the assumptions of a hypothesis that merely postulates. They are *a priori* in nature and can only claim to be a potential answer to a question. Their organisational propensities for further investigation, follows later. In other words, ideas serve actions with justifying motives. For instance, the failed attempts in the mid-1840s by the Cawood brothers to develop a harbour, called Port Jessie, at Kleinemonde (Pons 2000: 15; Jones 1966: 74), illustrates how incorrect application of theories have led to many disappointments surrounding this ill-fated port.

Thirdly, theories have an effect on people and evoke emotions in the sense of being optimistic in nature, or that they create negative human responses: e.g. the positive idea of 'liberty', regardless how much (or often) it has been violated in practice, still recurs in French public opinion. Similarly, an example form Xhosa history underlines our point. South African historian Jeff Peires (2003: 11–12) makes no secret that he does not share either the chiefs'-plot theory, or the Grey's-plot theory to interpret the cattle-killing of the mid-1850s. This introduces the issues of subjectivity and associated problems surrounding historical selection and interpretation, and in a sense, we all make our own history.

The fourth characteristic refers to generalities involved in theory. Generalizations are eventually brought together under experimental laws. These generalizations range from the specific, to the very general. If a proposition explains only one or few events, we have a low-level generalization, but if a wide range is covered, then it is a high-level generalization. Similarly, Rüsen (1993: 23ff) is of the opinion that theorizing takes place at three levels: the level of broad basic principles where fields of study are opened up; the level of specific paradigms of historical interpretation and lastly, the level of mediating of a general periodization.

A further characteristic of a theory is that without *doing* something *with* a theory, it remains inconsequential. Once a theory has been developed, it needs to be applied or put into practice.

Theory has the distinct potential for predictive and technological applications and is often referred to as ‘applied theory’. Typically, then, knowledge does not stop once a theory has been constructed. In fact, theory is productive in the sense of a ‘something else-ness’ that can result from it. For instance, general principles or laws are derived from theory for further scientific use. The same applies to conclusions that are drawn from theories.

In addition, the testability characteristic of theory rests on the observation-principle that either supports or refutes theory. We do not deny that observations are biased and subjective. If a theory does not correspond to facts, it is questionable – therefore, facts precede theory. The close relationship between theory and the practical consequences of the hypothesis, is based on considerations of logic. In turn, the hypothesis must be theoretically validated. Testing theories in terms of predicting what developments will take place under certain desirable conditions, necessitates rational considerations.

A next characteristic of theory is probably best arrived at by answering the question: what are theories ultimately used for? The short answer is: since we cannot change the past, theories are human intellectual tools applied as a means to change current and future society. Excluded is the fact that sometimes theories are specifically developed for the sake of doing so, or the novelty thereof.

Once theoretical foundations of an idea/ideology have been outlined, they form the key for social transformation. Historical and present-day societal problems frequently give rise to the relevance of a particular theory. Thus, the meeting of human needs and purposes are based on the social theories that are employed to change civil behaviour - theoretical knowledge guides human practical action. The relevance and shaping of theory are based on the awareness of social and historical contexts in which a problem is formulated. Thus, a theory’s reconstructive capacity is based on the relevance associated with present-day problems.

But theories are not final or static. They cannot be accepted as absolute because human ideas and social constructs are not cast in stone, nor given. Our understanding of historical research results takes place against the backdrop of individual predicaments, views and choices that can never be for keeps. We cannot be sure of our knowing to be true, nor can such be granted to theories in general. A prime reason is the dubiousness to attach to theories that cover an infinite diversity of extremely complex facts, conclusiveness, even if they tally with available facts (Gellner 1991: 11–13). In essence, theories are accepted or not in agreement with the general state of science. Contradictions between theories show that they have reached their likely limits and must be changed and/or incorporated into larger theories in which contradictions finally disappear.

Marxist thinking has been a major philosophical undertaking for over a century. Its texts have meaning and value only when translated into political activity based on a guiding theory – and dialectically in so doing, strengthen its own theory. This critique focused not only on

material conditions (practical), but also on specific forms of social consciousness (theoretical). Much stemmed from the poor conditions of the industrial working class in England of the mid-19th century. It was under these conditions that humans 'make their own history under given circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past' (Marx 1978: 9). No doubt, many South African histories have subsequently been written based on theories of social consciousness that are critical of the present.

Critical theory (with all the various Marxist derivatives) is the dominant contemporary philosophical thinking. In our day and age, it guides a large proportion of social sciences, including history. Critical theory is simultaneously explanatory, practical and normative in nature. It seeks to achieve decreased domination and increased human freedom with the aim to transform contemporary capitalism into a consensual form of social life that is *more* democratic. In other words, critical theory reduces practical societal questions about the good life and aims to solve technical problems. These are based on Habermas' project of developing 'a theory of modern society conceived with a practical intention' (Habermas 2009: 1, 3). that addresses irrationalities of modern society in totality. As a result, historical alternatives form part of the objective of a critical theory of our society against the background of its used and unused capabilities for improving human societal conditions and to rid it from all forms of human enslavement.

5. Conclusion

Ancient distinction between theory and practice is no longer in use in everyday language. In social (and other) sciences, theory is a type of intellectual order, and how we view the interrelationship between theory and practice, influences our research methodologies and research outcomes. For Marxists, theory is the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself (Lukács 197: 13).

To speak (or think) contemptuously of theory is unwise, as would be the view that the relationship between theory and practice is one of trial (practice) and error (theory) with seemingly limited relevance to historical research. Naturally, when theory fails, it needs correction. The stakes in modern society are just too high to afford theoretical error. Therefore, theoretical thinking is no ivory-tower affair – in fact, 'practical philosophy' would probably be more appropriate, relevant and of value than ever before, for e.g. environmental historical research that pertains to e.g. the Kleinemonde estuaries.

Theory has educational and cultural implications as we observe how human interests have emerged in (and from) our natural history. Thus, we cannot have a critical and coherent conception of the world around us without a consciousness of its historicity. Theory is ultimately corrected by human history. A recent comparative study regarding global financial

crises underlines this view. Webb (2010: 54) wrote: ‘we need to consider the previous two depressions in order to understand the lessons they imparted, the economic theory they inspired, and the impact they had on subsequent generations.’

Our original definition of theory is too narrow as it excludes most elements of modern-day philosophy of *praxis* - a topic that merits special attention on its own. The ability of theory to systemize vast amounts of knowledge is undeniable and contemporary non-technical use of the word is different (and rightfully so) from ancient Aristotelian thinking. It is distinguishable form scientific theory. Furthermore, the potential semantic confusion surrounding theory should not deter us from attempts to come to grips with it, nor should there be any reason for reduced application in historical sciences.

Nevertheless, theories remain fundamental to growth of scientific historical knowledge. It is productive to have different approaches of defining theory because they assist to clarify the structure and characteristics of theory (although at times, it seems to rather complicate understanding of this concept). Historical writing benefits from such open academia, as would our improved understanding of past and present civic society. In this manner, theory serves as protection against regression of human self-interest. It is in the three primary cognitive areas of work knowledge, practical knowledge and emancipatory knowledge respectively (MacIsaac 1996: 1), that historical research and critical theory draw on the relationship between theory and practice (Engelbrecht 2011).

A theory remains, relative to the facts, a hypothesis. Therefore, and in order to move away from hypotheses, the application of critical theoretical thinking is a necessary requirement for the future philosophy of history. It is unlikely that theoretical expression can be separated from societal direction – and consequently, the denial of *praxeology* in historical writing, would keep historians hostage to traditional theory. For the historian then, theory serves mainly to enlighten those to whom it is directed – it serves to legitimize the work of those engaged in enlightenment.

References

Aristotle, 1991. *The Metaphysics.* (Translated by JH McMahon). Prometheus Books, New York.

Bezuidenhout, B. (n.d.) *The 10.20 to Grahamstown. Blaauwkrantz Bridge railway Disaster – 22 April 1911.* Grocott’s Publishers and Printers, Grahamstown.

Elphick, R and Giliomee, H. (eds.) 1980. *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1820.* Longman Penguin South Africa, Cape Town and London.

Engelbrecht, C. 2014. ‘Globalization Theory and Reference to Aspects of Eastern Cape (South Africa) History’, in https://www.academia.edu/39603323/Globalization_Theory_ and_Reference_to_Aspects_of_Eastern_Cape_South_Africa_History, pp.1–10. [Accessed on 13 July 2019].

Engelbrecht, C. 2019a. ‘Limitations in History. Part 1: Problems with Historical Facts’, in https://www.academia.edu/39451806/Limitations_in_History_Part_1_Problems_ with_Historical_Facts, pp.1–20. [Accessed on 9 June 2019.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2019b. ‘Marx’s Theory of Colonization and Contemporary Eastern Cape (South Africa) Historiography’, in https://www.academia.edu/39479219/Marxs_theory_of_ colonisation_and_contemporary_Eastern_Cape_South_Africa_historiography, pp.1–25. [Accessed on 9 June 2019.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2019c. ‘Traditional and Critical Theory – Any Relevance for Aspects of Eastern Cape (South Africa) history?’, in https://www.academia.edu/39477357/Traditional_and_critical_theory_second_final_version pp.1–14. [Accessed on 13 July 2019].

Gellner, E. 1991. *Plough, Sword and Book. The Structure of Human History.* Paladin Grafton Books, London.

Habermas, J. 2009. *Theory and Practice.* An Ariadne Book. Beacon Press, Boston.

Held, D. 1980. *Introduction to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas.* University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

Hopkins, AG. (ed.) 2002. *Globalization in World History*. Pimlico, London.

Jones, EM. 1966. *The Lower Albany Chronicle. Part Three. 1841–1850.* The Lower Albany Historical Society, Port Alfred.

Jones, EM. 1969. *Roll of the British Settlers in South Africa. Part I up to 1826.* A.A. Balkema, Cape Town.

MacIsaac, D. 1996. ‘The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas’, in http://physiced.buffalostate.edu/danowner/habcritthy.html, pp.1–3. [Accessed on 5 October 2010].

Hanley, C. ‘Philosophy of Action. Theory and Praxis in Aristotle and Heidegger’, in http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Acti/ActiHanl.htm, pp.1–6. [Accessed on 27 January 2010.]

Lipton, M. 1986. *Capitalism and Apartheid. South Africa, 1910-1986.* David Philip, Cape Town and Wildwood House, London.

Lukács, G. 1971. *History and Class Consciousness*. (Translated by R. Livingstone). The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Marx, K. 1978. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.* Foreign Languages Press, Peking.

Parry, R. 2007. ‘Episteme and Techné’, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

_____

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/, pp.1–22. [Accessed on 27 January 2010].

Peires, J. 2003. *The Dead will Arise. Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-killing Movement of 1856–7.* Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Pons, S. 2000. *Kleinemonde. "This Corner of Paradise."* 3 Vernon Place, Port Alfred.

Popper, K. 2002. *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.* Reprint. Routledge Classics, London and New York.

Rüsen, J. 1993. *Studies in Metahistory*. (Edited and introduced by P. Duvenhage). HSRC Publishers, Pretoria.

Russell, B. 1971. *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell. Vol.3. 1944-1967.* 2nd impression. George Allen and Unwin, London.

Scheuerman, W. 2006. 'Globalization', in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization/, pp.1–13. [Accessed on 22 January 2010.]

Turpin, E. 1964. *Basket Work Harbour*. Howard Timmins, Cape Town.

Van Dyke, V. 1978. *Political science. A Philosophical Analysis.* Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Van Niekerk, L, GC Bate, and AK Whitfield (eds.) 2008. *An Intermediate Ecological Reserve Determination Study of the East Kleinemonde Estuary*. (No place).

Webb, A. 'Booms and Crashes: What Lessons can we Learn From a Study of the Past?' (E Morse Jones Memorial Lecture delivered 20th Aug. 2009), in *Toposcope*, Vol.XLI, 2010, pp.54–62.